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Crimes Against Peace in
International Law: From Nurnberg
to the Present
By MANUEL R. GARClA-MORA*

Of the three charges contained in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal that sat at Niirnberg,', the so-called
crimes against peace have undoubtedly caused the greatest controversy. Technical questions concerning the retroactive character
of the law applied by the Tribunal and the apparent disregard
of the maxim nulla poena sine lege were vigorously contested by
international jurists at the time.2 And today, almost two decades
after the execution of the NUrnberg Judgment, difficulties still
remain regarding the nature of crimes against peace and the
application of the Niirnberg precedent in future international
law.3 These problems are specially relevant in connection with
contemporary schemes designed for the maintenance of peace.
It is thus the purpose of this article to determine the precise
nature of crimes against peace as construed by the Niirnberg and
other military tribunals, and to discuss the development of this
concept in subsequent international instruments. It is hoped that
in so doing some useful light may be shed upon the meaning
of these offenses.
' Professor of Law, Fordham University. B.S., LL.B., 1943, University of
Panama; LL.M., 1944, A.M., 1946, Harvard University; J.S.D., 1948, Yale University.
1 For text of the Charter, see 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International
Military Tribunal 11 (1947).
2
For refutation of some of these objections, see Glueck, The Niirnberg Trial
and Aggressive War, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 396, 407 (1945-1946); Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflicts 358-3863 (1954); and Rousseau, Droit International Public 578-579 (1953). See, however, for a contrary view, Raja Gabaglia,
GuErra e Direito Internacional 114-115 (1949).
3 See Kelsen, Will the Judgment in the Nuremberg Trial Constitute a
Precedent in International Law?, 1 Intl L.Q. 153 (1947). See also Schwarzenberger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, 21 Tulane L. Rev. 329, 344-351 (19461947).
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THE NATURE OF CRIMES AGAINST PEACE

According to the Nirnberg Charter crimes against peace consist in the "planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war
of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties,
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or
conspiracy for the accomplishment of the foregoing."4 Essentially
the same perspective may be seen to infuse the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East 5 under which
the Japanese leaders were tried and punished, and the Control
Council Law No. 10, enacted on December 20, 1945,6 by the four
Powers occupying Germany, for the trial of the so-called minor
war criminals. 7 The application of the Nilrnberg provision was
quickly revealed as inapt for the specific circumstances of the
cases. The principles involved proved embarrassing to the presiding judges and led them to base their determination upon two
assumptions, the validity of which has been seriously questioned.
The first of such assumptions consists in the belief that a war of
aggression was an international crime before the London Agreement of August 8, 1945, under which the Interantional Military
Tribunal at Nirnberg was established. 9 The Tribunal succinctly
said that in its opinion "aggressive war is a crime under international law."' 0 Unfortunately, however, the Niirnberg Judgment
did not adequately deal with this assertion, thus leaving the mat4 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Niirnberg art. 6, para. (a).
(a). There is a slight modification in the wording of the provision, for the Tokyo
Charter conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal to try Crimes Against Peace:
namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared
war of aggression, or a war in violation of International Law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing." For text of this Charter, see In re Hirota
and Others, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, November
12, 1948, [19481 Ann. Dig. 356, 357-358 (No. 118) (1953).
5 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5, para.
6For the text of this law, see Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the
Army on the Niirnberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10
at 250 (1949).
7 Control Council Law No. 10 art. II, sect. 1, para. (a).
8Professor Percy E. Corbett says that those who wrote the decision "were
catching at straws." See Corbett, Law and Society in the Relations of States
.
231 (1951).
9For the text of this Agreement, see Sohn, Cases and Materials On United
Nations Law 858-859 (1956).
10 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal 224 (1947). See also 22 Id. at 467. Long before 1945 Professor H.
Donnedieu De Vabres had maintained that "a War of aggression is a crime."
See De Vabres, Les Principes Modernes du Droit Penal International 426 (1928).
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ter subject to much speculation and doubt. Instead the Tribunal
contented itself with saying that "'The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding upon the Tribunal,"" and that since the
Charter made "the planning or waging of a war of aggression or
a war in violation of international treaties a crime," it was not
"strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution of the London Agreeinent."' 12 It did say, however, that "to initiate a war of aggression . .. is not only an international crime; it is the supreme
international crime..
."13 The Tribunal supported its position
by citing such pre-war agreements as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of
August 27, 1928, outlawing war as an instrument of national
policy, the Draft Treaty of Mutual .Assistance sponsored by the
League of Nations in 1923 providing in Article 1 that "aggression is an international crime," the Preamble to the League of
Nations Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1924 stating that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of the solidarity between nations and therefore is an international crime, the declaration adopted by the Assembly of the
League of Nations on September 24, 1927, saying that war is an
international crime, and the resolution unanimously adopted on
February 18, 1928, by the twenty-one American Republics at
Havana providing that a "war of aggression constitutes an international crime against the human species."' 14 This is an impressive list indeed, but it should immediately be added that aside
from the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which at the outbreak of the war
was in force between sixty-three States, the other instruments
mentioned by the Tribunal either never came into force or else
were mere resolutions without any building force. And even in
respect to the Kellogg-Briand Pact, no specific condemnation
of aggression is found within its terms, nor an individual criminal
liability for this offense.' 5 The assumption, therefore, that a war
11 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 218 (1947).
1222 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal 461 (1948).
13 Id. at 427.
14 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the Intentional Military Tribunal
at 219-222 (1947).
16 See, however Pompe, Aggressive War, an International Crime 254 (1953).
Cf. Monaco, Manuafe di Diritto Internationale Pubblico 168 (1960).
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of aggression is an international crime remains, in the main,
highly conjectural.1 6
The second important assumption underlying the Niirnberg
Judgment concerns the criterion of aggression adopted by the
Tribunal. The Tribunal seemed to have assumed that aggression
is a well-established and fairly precise concept in international
criminal law. Yet, unlike domestic criminal legislation where
crimes are precisely defined so that individuals may know exactly
the limits of permissible behavior, the crime of aggression is a
most vague and general concept not yet defined nor described
by any international instrument.'1 The Niirnberg Charter itself
offered no criterion of aggression for the guidance ofthe Tribunal,
nor did the latter ever formulate any criteria in the course of its
decisions. 18 As the United Nations International Law Commission subsequently observed, what the Tribunal did was to review "the historical events before and during the war" in an
effort to determine whether aggression had been committed by
the defendants. 9 From such a broad and flexible orientation,
the Tribunal found that certain of the defendants had committed
acts of aggression in seizing Austria and Czechoslovakia, 20 and
16Se 2 Guggenheim, Trait6 de Drait International Public 43 (1954); 2
.blico
322-323 (3d ed. 1955); SchwarzenPodest Costa, Derecho Internacional P
berger sPra note 3,at 346. See alote dsentn
oion
of ude RIg
perhaps
in
thatconsidered
aggressive
the
where he maintains
the Tokyo
subject Judgment,
of moral condemnation,
was "not
a war,
true although
crime before
and
in
the
beginning
of
this
war
and
could
not
be
considered
as
such
for
lack
of
those conditions in international relations on which such a view could be based."
In re Hirota, International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Tokyo, November
12,
[1948]Trial,
Ann.41Dig.
375 L.
(No.
(1953). Cf. Wright, The Law of
the 1948,
Nuremberg
Am.356,
J. Int'
38, 118)
2 (1947).
T
' Alfaro, The Question of the Definition of Aggression, U.N. CGss. Ass., Irr'L
8
L. CoMM.,
8SanAggression
S~ss., A/CN.
30, A1951).
Stone,
and 41L.8
World(May
Order:
Critique of United Nations Theories
of
Aggression
136
(1958).
The
Tokyo
Charter
not kind
offer of
a definition
of
aggression either. However, the Tribunal formulateddid
some
a criterion.
Thus, in describing the wars of aggression which Japan lanched on December
7, 1941, against Great Britain, the United States and The Netherlands as unprovoked attacks, prompted by the desire to seize the possessions of these nations,"
it wvent
on to say,
may be
the difficulty
of the
stating
a comprehensive
definition
of athat
war"Whatever
of aggression,
attacks
made with
above
motive cannot but be characterized as wars of aggression." For this portion of the
Toko Judgment, see Sohn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 915.
Se Formulation of the Niirnberg Principles, Report of the International
Law Commission Covering the Work of its Second Session June S-July 29, 1950,
L.
GE.
ASS., OR . nEC., 5th Sess. Supp. No. 12 (A/116) at 11-14 (1950).
o0 These aggressive actions were regarded as steps in the plan to wage
aggressive war. See 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before he Interion.a
Military Tribunal 433-439 (1948). See, however, some decisions of the American
(Continued on next page)
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war of aggression against Poland, Belgium, Denmark, Norway,
Holland, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece, the Soviet Union, and
the United States.2 1 The Tribunal significantly added that these
findings made it unnecessary to discuss in detail whether these
aggressive wars were also "wars in violation of international
treaties, agreements, or assurances" within the terms of the
Charter." 2 It is thus obvious that a war of aggression may technically exist quite independently of a war "in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances." It may also be noted
that these two kinds of wars constitute two separate and independent categories of crimes against peace.
Despite the broad generalizations of the Ntirnberg Judgment
certain legal principles can be readily perceived which reveal
more clearly the nature of crimes against peace as understood
by the Tribunal. Turning again to the Nflrnberg Charter, it will
be recalled that crimes against peace embrace a series of offenses
consisting in the planning, preparation, initiation, or waging of
a war of aggression, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of the preceding acts. 23 Although

at first sight it may appear that each one of these acts constitutes
a separate and distince crime against peace,2 4 in practice, however, the guilt of the defendants was judged on the basis of two
counts whose precise limits are difficult to mark in specific cases. 23
Count one dealt with a common plan or conspiracy to plan, prepart, initiate and wage aggressive war, while count two was concerned with the planning, preparation, initiation and waging
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

military tribunals established at Niirnberg under Control Council Law No. 10,

where the seizure of Austria and parts of Czechoslovakia was regarded as aggressive in the case of Austria, and aggressive invasion in the case of Czechoslovakia,
and in both cases as crimes against peace. See United States v. Weizsaecker, 14
Trials of War Criminals Before the Niirnberg Military Tribunals under Control
Council Law No. 10 at 331, 336-337 (1949). (Hereinafter cited as War Crimes
Reports). For an excellent discussion of this distinction, see Woetzel, The Nuremberg Trials in International Law 223-224 (1960).
21 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 439-458 (1948).
22 1 Trial of the Maior War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal
23216 (1947).
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg art. 6, para. (a).
24 See Greenspan, The Modern Law of Land Warfare 445 (1959).
2
5The Tribunal thus said: "We shall . .. discuss both Counts together, as
they are in substance the same." See 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before
the International Military Tribunal 224 (1947).
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of specific wars of aggression. 26 The vague and clumsy drafting of
these two counts left the Niirnberg Charter open to a wide and
flexible interpretation sometimes productive of highly undesirable results. The separate discussion of the two counts will adequately support this conclusion.
As to count one, wholly apart from the fact that the Charter
did not define conspiracy, 27 international jurists have agreed that
there was no crime of conspiracy in international law in 1939,
and that even in domestic legal systems other than those of the
common law world, this crime is largely unknown. 28 Yet it must
not be assumed that the Tribunal regarded conspiracy within the
meaning of Anglo-American criminal law. 29 The Tribunal considered conspiracy as a number of closely related acts developed
from 1919 to 1945 and including the formation of the Nazi Party
in 1919 as "the instrument of cohesion among the defendants,"
the overthrow of the Treaty of Versailles, the secret rearmament
30
by Germany, and the planning and waging of aggressive actions.
What seems particularly significant is that these acts in themselves did not constitute a criminal conspiracy under the indictment unless they were a part of a plan to wage aggressive war.
The Tribunal was most explicit in this connection when it said:
...the conspiracy must be clearly outlined in its criminal
purpose. It must not be too far removed from the time of
decision and action. The planning, to be criminal, must not
rest merely on the declarations of a party programme, such
as are found in the twenty-five points of the Nazi Party,
announced in 1920, or the political affirmations expressed in
Mein Kampf in later years. The Tribunal must examine
whether a concrete plan to wage war 3existed, and determine
the participants in that concrete plan. '
It can be readily seen, therefore, that the crime of conspiracy
cannot be isolated from the crime of waging concrete wars of
26 Id. at 29, 42. Actually, -these two counts overlap. See Leventhal, Harris,

Woolsey,
& Farr, The Nurenberg Verdict, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 857, 882 (1946-1947).
27
The Tokyo Judgment defined conspiracy as "an agreement' to wage aggressive war.
See Sohn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 910.
28
See, for discussion, Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 361
(1954).
29 See, generally, Perkins, Criminal Law 527 (1957); Williams, Criminal Law
663-669 (2d ed. 1961).
30 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal 224-225 (1947).
31 Id. at 225.
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aggression under count two of the indictment. Yet is has already
been seen that conspiracy to commit aggression and the waging
of specific wars of aggression are in principle two separate and
distinct crimes against peace.
The technical difficulty faced by the Tribunal in describing
the crime of conspiracy can be clearly seen in another portion of
the Judgment. While the notion of conspiracy in Anglo-American
criminal law signifies a combination between two or more persons to commit an unlawful act or to do a lawful act by criminal
or unlawful means, thus implying the existence of a "unity of
design and purpose," 32 the Niirnberg Judgment apparently could
not point to one single combination embracing one single master
plan to commit crimes against peace. What it did find were separate plans, which were nothing more than "a series of connected
events," 33 leading up to the commission of aggressive wars. The
Tribunal sharply said:
It is not necessary to decide whether a single master conspiracy between the defendants has been established by the
evidence . . . the evidence establishes with certainty the existence of many separate plans rather than a single conspiracy
embracing them all .... It is immaterial to consider whether
a single conspiracy to the extent and over the time set out
in the Indictment has been conclusively proved. Continued
planning, with aggressive
war as the objective, has been estab34
lished beyond doubt.
Conceivably, therefore, conspiracy could exist even though
no specific combination for the accomplishment of the unlawful
act was present. 35 A distinguished jurist has suggested that this
rather flexible interpretation may well have been adopted to allow
more latitude in the proof of the other counts than would otherwise be permitted under the conspiracy concept in Anglo-American law. 36 The force of this suggestion can be most clearly seen
when remembering that not a single defendant was convicted
on the conspiracy count alone, and that conviction on this count
32 Perldns, op. cit. supra note 29, at 530.
33 Brownlie, International Law and The Use of Force by States 201 (1963).

. 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 225 ( 1947 ).
35 In United States v. -Von Leeb, 11 War Crimes Reports 488-489 (1948), a

United States military tribunal stressed the necessity of proving the existence of
a concrete plan in order to constitute conspiracy to commit a crime against peace.
36 Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 361 (1954).
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was only had when connected with the planning and preparation
for specific wars of aggression under count two of the indictment.3 7
It thus becomes clear that the conspiracy count was unnecessary
and superfluous, since the criminal liability of the defendants
could have been adequately judged on the basis of planning and
preparation for specific aggressive wars under count two.38 This
observation is of critical importance, for any assessment of the
future of the crime of conspiracy in international law must take
account of the confusion and uncertainty underlying the Niirnberg Judgment. On such a basis, the assertion that there is a notion of consiparcy to commit a crime against peace can hardly
besupported. 39
The second count of the Niirnberg indictment embraces in
its widest sweep all the component steps leading up to the commission of a war of aggression. More specifically considered, these
components include the "planning," "preparation," "initiation,"
and "waging" of aggressive war. While these concepts might
logically be expected to differ in their technical import, the
Nilrnberg Judgment, however, did not distinguish between "planning" and "preparation" and, further, failed to give a separate
consideration to the concept of "initiation." The operative reality
of these four conceptions was substantially reduced by the Judgment to "preparation," and "waging" of aggressive war.40 This
certainly reflects the atmosphere of ambiguity and abstraction in
which the Nirnberg Charter was framed.
Looking comprehensively at the Judgment, some light may
be shed upon the meaning of the above conceptions. Thus,
"planning," and "preparation" were broadly considered by the
Tribunal as embracing all the stages necessary for the initiation
of a war of aggression. The Tribunal clearly said that " 'planning'
41
and 'preparation' are essential to the making of war." It will
3 It is also interesting to note that although count one charged, in addition,
conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, the latter conspiracy variant was disregarded by the Tribunal. See I Trial of the Major War
Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 226 (1947).
3 Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 33, at 201.
39 Brand, The War Crimes Trials and the Laws of War, 26 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L.
1949. at 414, 419-421 (n.d.).
40 See, however, Kelsen, Principles of International Law 135 (1952) who believes that "planning," "preparation," and "initiation" of aggressive war are new
international crimes.
41 1. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the Interunional Militant
Tribunal 224 (1947).
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naturally follow that "planning" and "preparation" cannot be
regarded as elements of guilt under the counts of the indictment unless they are a part of a specific plan for the making of
aggressive war. A direct connection between "planning" and
"preparation" on the one hand, and the "waging" of aggressive
war, on the other, was essential for conviction on the charge of
"planning" and "preparation" for aggressive war. When this
requisite connection was found, "planning" and "preparation"
became crimes against peace. Clearly, then, the "planning" and
"preparation" for a nebulous and future plan of aggression unconsummated by a concrete aggressive war is not sufficient to en4
gage the criminal responsibility of the individuals concerned. The trial of Schacht is particularly instructive in this connection,
for while the Tribunal recognized that he was largely responsible for the rapid rearmament of Germany after 1933, he was
nevertheless acquitted on both counts. This portion of the Judgment is specially significant, for the Tribunal unmistakably made
the crime of "planning" and "preparation" for aggressive war
entirely dependent upon the waging of such a war. The Tribunal
thus said:
But rearmament of itself is not criminal under the Charter.
To be a Crime against Peace under Article 6 it must be shown
that Schacht carried out this rearmament
as part of the Nazi
43
plans to wage aggressive war.

From this passage, it should be evident that if "planning"
and "preparation" are found to exist in a specific case, criminal
responsibility is still no necessary result. In these terms, "planning" and "preparation" really represent the beginning of a particular pattern of behavior which can be characterized as criminal
if functionally related to aggressive war. It may additionally be
noted that implicit in the Schacht decision is the distinction between actions and policies in support of the war effort which are
criminal, and those which are not.44 The decisive test in this con42

Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 33, at 196.

1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal 309 (1947).
44 Thus, the Tribunal acquitted Speer who became head of the armament
industry. The Tribunal said: "His activities in charge of German armament
43

production were in aid of the war effort in the same way that other productive

enterprises aid in the waging of war; but the Tribunal is not prepared to find that
such activities involved engaging in the common plan to wage aggressive war as
(Continued on next page)
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nection is whether such actions and policies are directly connected with plans of aggression.
In contrast with "planning" and "preparation," the "waging"
of aggressive war is by itself a crime against peace, even if not
directly connected with the former. Thus conceived, the "waging"
of aggressive war is totally independent of the "planning" and
"preparation" for such a war. The opinion of the Tribunal in
respect to Admiral Dinitz illustrates this point well, for he was
convicted under count two alone for waging aggressive submarine
warfare, even though no connection with the "planning" and
"preparation" of such a war could be found. 45 Moreover, the
conviction on this charge of civilians such as industrialists and
financiers as well as military men strikingly indicates that the
crime of waging unlawful war is not limited to the exclusive
46
military facets of a war.
It finally remains to observe that although the crime of waging
aggressive war would seem to be fairly broad since its existence is
not necessarily dependent upon any other factor, the Tribunal
significantly convicted on this charge only those defendants who
were so close to Hitler as to possess concrete knowledge of his
47
It
aggressive plans and to collaborate intimately with him.

would seem inexorably to follow, therefore, that the aggressive war
charge applies only to high-ranking military personnel and high
State officials and, consequently, not everyone in uniform who
fights in a war of aggression can be charged with the crime. 48
This is certainly a most reasonable construction, for the conception of "waging" would seem to imply the ability to influence
policy decisions-a power which personnel below the top echelon
of the State does not possess. 49 It may thus be submitted that in
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

charged under Count One or waging aggressive war as charged under Count Two."
1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal
330-331 (1947).
45 1 at 310-311. See also 22 Trial of the Major War Criinals Before the
International
Military Tribunal at 556-557 (1948).
46
Besides military men, such civilians as Frick, Von Neurath and Rosenberg
were convicted under count two.
47 See 22 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military
Tribunal
468-469 (1948).
48
This was the assumption of the International Law Commission in formulating the Principles of Niirnberg. See note 19 supra.
49This

point was repeatedly stressed in the trial of the so-called minor war

criminals by American military tribunals. See, specifically, United States v. Von
Leeb, 11 War Crimes Reports 488-489 (1949). In United States v. Krupp, 9
(Continued on next page)
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assessing the guilt of the defendants under the count of waging
aggressive war the Niirnberg Tribunal adopted a narrow test of
responsibility, thereby substantially limiting the scope of the
crime.5 0
From the foregoing exposition, the most conspicuous facts
about crimes against peace are both their vague and general description, and the utter lack of agreement regarding their criminality under international law.5 1 For an accurate consideration
of this point, it is highly relevant to contrast briefly crimes against
peace with war crimes and crimes against humanity, both of which
were also punishable under the Niirnberg Charter. 2 The conception of war crimes was not new in 1945, but has reference to
specific violations of the laws and customs of war made punish3
able by domestic legislation and international conventions.5
Similarly, crimes against humanity consist of acts generally recognized as criminal by the penal law of all civilized States.5" Therefore, war crimes and crimes against humanity refer to clearly
defined offenses, whose criminality was recognized long before
1945, so that the charge of ex post facto legislation could not
possibly be applied to these offenses. 55 Crimes against peace, on
the other hand, were rather novel in 1945, 6 thus giving rise to
the charge of ex post facto legislation, and even after the Nflrnberg and the other war crimes trials, they have remained largely
undefined. Considerable controversy and doubt still attend their
determination. Subject to this qualification, therefore, the general effect of the charge of crimes against peace is somewhat
weakened by the uncertainty underlying its application and, thus,
(Footnote continued from preceding page)

War Crimes Reports 393 (1950), the prosecution did not discharge its burden of
proof as to this point; thus the charge of crimes against peace was dismissed by
the tribunal.
0 De Vabres, Les Procs de Nuremberg Devant des Principesdu Droit Penal
International,70 Hague Recueil 477, 528 (1947).
51
See note 3 supra.
52
Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Niinberg art. 6, paras.
(b) & (c).
53.See Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principle of Nonextradition of Political Offenders, 9 Wayne L. Rev. 269, 270-275 (196:3).
54 See Garcia-Mora, Crimes Against Humanity and the Principle of Nonextradition
of PoliticalOffenders, 62 Mich. L. Rev. (1964).
55
See, generally, Paoli, Contribution a l'Etude des Crimes de Guerre et des
Crimes Contre I'Humanit6 en Droit Pdnal International,39 Revue G6n6ral de Droit
International Public 129 (France, 1941-1945).
G6 For the view that this charge was not really so novel, see Maridakis, Un
Prc6dent du Procms de Nuremberg Tirg de lHistoire de la Grace Ancienne, 5
Revue Hellhnique de Droit International 1 (1952).
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can scarcely be a promising subject for an international agreement in the near future.
II. Crimes Aginst Peace in the Draft Code of Offenses Against the
Peace and Security of Mankind.
Partially in recognition of the above considerations, and in an
attempt at clarification, the United Nations General Assembly
requested the International Law Commission in 1947 (a) to
formulate the principles of international law recognized in the
Charter and in the Judgment of the Nilrnberg Tribunal, and
(b) to prepare a Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, indicating clearly the place to be accorded to the above principles. 57 While the formulation of the
International Law Commission regarding the Judgment of the
Niirnberg Tribunal reproduced in almost identical terms the
provision of the Niirnberg Charter concerning crimes against
peace so that no progress was made in this regard, 58 the real
innovation of the Commission consisted in the adoption of a
Draft Code of Offenses against the Peace and Security of Mankind in its third session in 1951.59 The most important aspect of
this Code is its attempt to impute criminal responsibility to individuals for acts which previously only engaged the responsibility
of the State. 60 After providing that "Offenses against the peace and
security of mankind, as defined in this Code, are crimes under
international law, for which the responsible individuals shall be
punished," 61 the Draft Code proceeds to enumerate the acts
which fall into this forbidden category. A careful reading of
these acts at once reveals three fundamental departures from the
Ntirnberg Charter and Judgment. First, while the Draft Code
evidently seeks to project much the same policy that the Niirnberg Charter sought to apply in respect to crimes against peace,
it has, however, enlarged the scope of such crimes by linking them
57 Resolution 177 (II), November 21, 1947.
58 See Principle VI, which incorporates the Nirnberg provision. For text,
see note 19 supra.
59 For text, see Report of the International Law Commission Covering the
Work of its Third Session May 16-July 27, 1951, U.N. Gen. Ass., Off. Rec., 6th
Sess., Supp. No. 9 (A/1858) at 10-14 (1951). This Draft Code was revised in
1954. See for the amendment, Sohn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 998-1001.
60 For a discussion of the Draft Code from the standpoint of individual
responsibility, see Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for Hostile Acts of
Private Persons Against Foreign States 36-46 (1962).
61 Draft Code art. 1.
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with other offenses which affect the security of mankind. It is for
this reason that war crimes and crimes against humanity, which
under the Niirnberg Charter were separate crimes, are now included within the general category of offenses described in the
Code. 2 The offenses against the peace and security of mankind,
therefore, go far beyond the acts giving rise to responsibility for
crimes against peace under the Niirnberg Charter.
Second, while both the Niirnberg Charter and Tribunal failed
to give a definition of a war of aggression, the Draft Code, on the
other hand, has attempted a general and inexhaustive description
of aggressive acts. It says in this connection that an act of aggression includes "the employment by the authorities of a State of
armed force against another State for any purpose other than
national or collective self-defense or in pursuance of a decision or
'
recommendation by a competent organ of the United Nations."
It may significantly be added that such other acts as any threat
to resort to an act of aggression, preparation for the employment
of armed force against another State,64 incursion of armed bands
into foreign territory, fomenting civil strife and encouragement of
terrorist activities against another State are also regarded as
offenses against the peace and security of mankind and presumably
as acts of aggression. 65 The comments on every one of these
offenses specifically say that the offenses thus defined can only be
committed by the authorities of the State, though the criminal
responsibility of private persons is similarly envisaged.
Third, included in the Draft Code are notions of conspiracy,
incitement, attempt and complicity to commit the offenses, which
are difficult to grasp unless related to the actual determinations
of the Niirnberg Tribunal. 6 The Draft Code thus says that the
following shall constitute punishable offenses:
(i) Conspiracy to commit any of the offences defined in
the preceding paragraphs of this article; or
(ii) Direct indictment to commit any of the offences defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article; or
2
G Draft Code art. 2, paragraphs 10 & 11. In paragraph 9 genocide is also
included
as an offense.
63
Draft Code art. 2, para. (1).
G4 "Preparation" was used here in the same sense described by the Niirnberg
Tribunal.
Thus, in this offense "preparation' includes "planning" as well.
66 5 Draft Code art. 2, paras. (2), (8), (4), (5) & (6).
1Brownlie, op. cit. supra note 33, at 207.
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(iii) Attempts to commit any of the offences defined in the
preceding paragraphs of this article; or
(iv) Complicity in the commission of any of the offences
defined in the preceding paragraphs of this article. 7
The comment on this provision clearly indicates that the notion of "conspiracy" was taken from the Nfirnberg Charter and,
therefore, carries with it the uncertainties of the Niirnberg Judgment. On the other hand, the notions of "incitement," "attempt,"
and "complicity" are not found in the Niirnberg Charter, but
were subsequently incorporated into the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted
by ihe United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948,8
and ratified by a substantial number of States. It is thus obvious
that as regards these offenses the Draft Code goes beyond the
Niirnberg precedent. But this provision of the Code is of considerable scope and importance for another reason, namely, that
although the Niirnberg Judgment seemed to have linked the
criminal responsibility of individuals with the delinquent character of the activity engaged in by the State, 2 the Draft Code, on
the other hand, apparently proceeds on a differentiation between
State and individual responsibility. This observation may be supported on two grounds. First, though perhaps difficult to mark
in practice, the Draft Code foresees the possibility that the authorities of the State may become criminally liable at a different stage
at which the responsibility of the State arises.7 0 In fact, there is
scarcely any doubt that in respect to certain individuals criminal
liability may be entirely absent. These assertions are instructively
illustrated by the comment on Article 2, paragraph (12) of the
Code, which says:
In including 'complicity" in the commission of any of the
offences defined in the preceding paragraphs among the acts
which are offences against the peace and security of mankind,
it is not intended to stipulate that all those contributing, in
the normal exercise of their duties, to the perpetration of
67 Draft Code art. 2, para. (12).
68 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art.
3. For text, see U.N. Cen. Ass., Off. Rec., 3d Sess., 1st Pt., Res. No. 260 at 174
(A/81) (1948) (Effective January 12 1951).
69 For discussion, see Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law 266, 267

(1958).
70 Cf. Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 Am. J. Int'l L. 514-522
(1956).
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offences against the peace and security of mankind could,
on that ground alone, be considered as accomplices in such
crimes. There can be no question of punishing as accomplices
in such an offence all the members of 71the armed forces of a
State or the workers in war industries.
It is to be further noted that the criminal responsibility of
the authorities of the State will not arise at all if it can be shown
that the individual charged with State functions did not have a
moral choice in fact open to him.7 2 It is therefore clear that a
member of the government committing any of the crimes enumerated in the Code will be criminally liable only if in the prevailng circumstances it was quite possible for him to act contrary
73
to superior orders.
And, secondly, while the criminal responsibility of the State
is enforced by sanctions provided for by the Charter of the United
Nations,74 in respect to the individual the penalty for any of the
offenses defined in the Code is to be determined by the tribunal
exercising jurisdiction over the accused75 In this connection, the
Code envisages international criminal jurisdiction over individuals, but pending its establishment, measures may be adopted for
the application of the Code by national courts.7 6 It is highly relevant to note that according to the Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court, drafted by the United Nations Committee
on International Criminal Jurisdiction in 1951 and revised in
1953, in the trial of persons accused of crimes against international
law, in which crimes against peace are clearly included, the Court
is to apply international criminal law and, when appropriate,
national law.77 This would seem to suggest that the trial of persons
is to take effect without any reference to principles of State re71 Report of the International Law Commission, op. cit. supra note 59, at 13.
72 See Article 4 of the Draft Code, which is identical to Article 8 of the
Niirnberg Charter. See Report of the International Law Commission, op. cit. supra
note 73
59, at 18.
This is brought out by the Commission in its Comment on Article 4. See
Report of the International Law Commission, op. cit. supra note 59. at 18-14.
74 U.N. Charter ch. VII.
7
5 Draft Code art. 5.
73 Report of the International Law Commission, op. cit. supra note 59, at 11.
77 Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court art. 2. For text, see Report of the Conunittee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, U.N. Gen. Ass., Off.
Rec., 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11 (A/2186) Annex I, at 21-25 (1952). For discussion,

see Carjeu, Quelques Aspects du Nouveau Proet de Statut des Nations Unies pour
une Jurdisdiction Criminelle Internationale, 50 Revue CGn6ral de Droit International Public 401-415 (France, 1956).
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sponsibility.7 8 The combined operation of these principles would
seem to establish beyond any vestige of doubt that a criminal
individual liability may exist without any degree of connection
with State responsibility. 79 It will be recalled that under the
Nhrnberg Judgment the responsibility of the State and of the
individual were indissolubly linked.
In summing up the discussion of the Draft Code it may be
stressed that the type of criminal responsibility found therein
in respect to crimes against peace is decidedly more far-reaching
than that seen in the Niirnberg Charter and Judgment. It is in
this sense that the provisions of the Draft Code are innovatory
rather than declaratory of existing law. It may well be that the
Draft Code represents an attempt to overcome the difficulties
raised with respect to the retroactivity charge of the Niimberg
Charter. However, the broader basis upon which the criminal
responsibility of individuals is predicated may be open to the
objection that it is vague and general in the extreme, and that
in the area of international crimes more definite conceptions
are required precisely to avoid both the charge of retroactivity and
of violation of the maxim nulla poena sine lege repeatedly levelled
against the Nirnberg Judgment. 0 These criticisms are likely
to arise as long as there is no international legislature to enact
the law and an international criminal court to achieve uniformity
of decision. 81 But even conceding such obligations, it should be
quite evident that underlying the Draft Code is the attempt to
tighten up the obligations of individuals in respect to acts which
vitally engage the peace and security of mankind.
III. Crimes Against Peace in Treaties and
Constitutional Enactments
It should be clear from the preceding observations that the
International Law Commission presented its proposal de lege
7S Cf. Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security
of Mankind, 4 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 445, 454 (1955).
9 Cf. Bowett, op. cit. supra note 69. at 268.
60 This is likely to arise in view of the fact that the Draft Code does not pro-ide for the punishment of the offenses enumerated therein. Thus, Article 5 says
that "The penalty for any offence defined in this Code shall be determined by the
tribunal exercising jurisdiction over the individual accused, taking into account
the graity of the offence." See Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict
370-371 (1954).
61 See, generally, Fenwick, Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, 46 Am. J. Infl. L. 98, 100 (1952).
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ferenda and, hence, the provisions of the Code are far from
being binding upon the States. It is, however, in the Peace
Treaties ending World War II with certain States that crimes
against peace appear in an entirely different light. The pertinent
provisions of these treaties impose upon the defeated nations the
obligation to surrender persons accused of crimes against peace
found within their jurisdiction. Thus, according to the Peace
Treaty with Italy, 82 Italy agreed to "take all the necessary steps to
ensure the apprehension and surrender for trial of: (a) Persons
accused of having committed, ordered, or abetted war crimes and
crimes against peace or humanity." 83 Identical provisions are
found in the Peace Treaties with Rumania, 84 Bulgaria, 85 Finland, 6 and Hungary.87 Although the conception of crimes against
peace in the sense of Nfirnberg has clearly been incorporated into
these treaties in a more enduring form, the fact should not be
overlooked that the obligation undertaken by the signatory States
is of a rather limited character since it has reference to the surrender of fugitives and not to the definition or punishment of
the crimes. But even in respect to the extradition of offenders
the Peace Treaties give rise to further doubts, for not only can
an asylum State invoke traditional extradition doctrines to block
the surrender of individuals,88 but, perhaps vastly more important,
crimes against peace are likely to be regarded as political offenses
for which extradiction is not generally granted.8 9 Indeed, this is
82

Peace Treaty with Italy, February 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, T.I.A.S. 1
(1950); 42 Am. J. Intl L. Supp. 47 (1948).
8-3
Id. art. 45, para. (a).
84
Peace Treaty with Roumania, February 10, 1947, art. 6, para. (a), 61
Stat. 1757, T.I.A.S. No. 1650, 41 U.N.T.S. 50 (1949); 42 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp.
252 (1948).
85 Peace Treaty with Bulgaria, February 10, 1947, art. 5, para. (a), 61 Stat.
1915, T.I.A.S. No. 1650, 41 U.N.T.S. 50 (1949); 42 Am. J.Int'l L. Supp. 179
(1948).
86 Peace Treaty with Finland, February 10, 1947, art. 6, para. (a), 48
U.N.T.S. 228 (1950); 42 Am. J.Int'l L. Supp. 203 (1948).
871Peace Treaty with Hungary, February 10, 1947, art. 6 para (a), 61 Stat.
2065, T.I.A.S. No. 1651; 42 Am. J.Int'l L. Supp. 225 (1948).
s8 Thus, in 1949 Italy refused to extradite to Yugoslavia a person accused,
inter alia, of having committed war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity.
This result was achieved despite the provision of the Peace Treaty with Italy. See
In re Rulkaxina, Italy, Court of Appeal of Rome (Chamber of Accusations), July
28, 1949, [1949] Ann. Dig. 273, (No. 88) (1955).
S9 In his dissenting opinion in the Tokyo Judgment, Judge Roling regarded
the crime of waging aggressive war as a political offense. For this opinion, see
Sohn, op. cit. supra note 9, at 938. See also Woetzel, op. cit. supra note 20, at
168-169 and authorities therein cited.
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another persistent legal problem,90 and although admittedly the
exclusion of crimes against peace from the scope of political
offenses may be a useful development as a means of deterring
the commission of aggression, it is quite possible to argue that a
person accused of crimes against peace, just like any other political
offender, may well have waged a war of aggression for the sake
of his political convictions and as long as he remained within
the provisions of the laws and customs of war in the conduct of
hostilities, his acts clearly fall within the meaning of a purely
political offense. 91 Under these conditions, there seems to be no
compelling reason why his extradition should be granted. From
a broader perspective, in so far as the issues of trial and punishment of aggressor individuals are concerned, this question of the
political character of crimes against peace may become deeply
involved with peace enforcement measures, thereby depriving
the latter of much of their effectiveness and force. The difficulties
that may arise in this connection have largely been ignored.
If the foregoing observations be correct, it will at once be
seen that substantial doubts attend the definiteness of the Peace
Treaties in respect to the surrender of persons accused of crimes
against peace. Of-perhaps more contemporary importance is the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees adopted in Geneva
on July 28, 1951,92 by a United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries. In excluding from its benefits persons guilty of crimes
against peace, the Convention explicitly says:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any
persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons for
considering that:
(a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime,
or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international
instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes; ... 93

This provision is certainly related to the categories of crimes
against peace as found in the Nfirnberg Charter, and undoubtedly
90 See, generally, Neumann, Neutral States and the Extradition of War Criminals, 45 Am. J. Intl L. 495, 503 (1951).
91 For discussion, see Garcia-Mora. The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty
Problem of Extradition Law, 48 Va. L. Rev. 1226, 1231-1239 (1962).
92 In force April 22, 1954. For text, see U.N. Conf. of Plenipotentiaries on
the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Final Act and Convention Relating
to the93 Status of Refugees, A/Con. 2/108 at 17 (1951).
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, para. F.

1964]

CRLMIES AGAINST PEACE

assumes that the existence of these crimes is clear and unmistabable. The Convention should be limited, however, to recognizing
the criminality of aggressive war, for it neither punishes this crime
nor determines its make-up, thus removing much of the apparent
definiteness of the provision in question. For the meaning of
crimes against peace, the Nirnberg Judgment and the determinations of the other war crimes trials are still the only available
authorities.
WXkholly apart from the above treaties, the national constitutions of a number of States explicitly recognize the criminality of
aggressive war. As a vivid illustration of a typical constitutional
provision, the Constitution of Italy may particularly be noted, for
it says

Italy renounces war as an instrument of offense to the
liberty of other peoples or as a means of settlement of international disputes, and, on conditions of equality with other
States, agrees to the limitations of her sovereignty necessary
to an organization which will assure peace and justice among
nations, and promotes and encourages international organizations constituted for this purpose. 94
In varying formulations, the same principle has been incorporated in the constitutions of many other States. 95 It follows from

this exposition that even if no universally binding convention
imposes upon the States the obligation to punish the preparation
and waging of wars of aggression, the domestic legislation of the
States may explicitly prohibit it. 96 The provisions of the constitutions here cited, concurrent with the conventions previously
mentioned, show that there is a firm conviction among governments that aggressive war should be made an international de04 Constitution of the Italian Republic, 1947, art. 11. For text, see 2 Peaslee,

Constitutions of Nations 279 (1950).

95See the following constitutional provisions: Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1949, art. 26; Constitution of the German Democratic

Republic, 1949, art. 5; Constitution of Japan, 1946, art. 9; Constitution of the
Republic of Korea, 1948, art. 6; Constitution of the Union of Burma, 1947, § 211;
Constitution of the Philippines, 1947, § 3; Constitution of Venezuela, preamble.
9 In addition, some laws punishing offenses against the peace and security
of mankind were enacted by the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia,
Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Outer Mongolian Republic.
These laws, however, deal with war propaganda, which is punishable as a criminal
offense. For the text of these laws, see 46 Am. J. Int'l L. Supp. 35 et seq. (1952).
For discussion, see Grzybowsld & Pundeff, Soviet Bloc Peace Defense Laws, 46
Am. J. Intl L. 537 (1952), and Garcia-Mora, International Responsibility for
Subversive Activities and Hostile Propaganda by Private Persons Against Foreign
States, 35 Ind. L.J. 306, 322-324 (1960).
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linquency. Although some may argue that the matter was
definitely settled at Niirnberg, it may nevertheless be observed
that the Ntirnberg Judgment stands as a living reminder that the
future possibility of legally imputing criminal responsibility to
individuals for planning and waging aggressive war still needs to
be determined by a more explicit principle of existing international law.9 7 This conclusion is not only inescapable, but the
world community cannot safely afford to ignore it."'
IV. Conclusion
The preceding pages have unfolded the development of crimes
against peace as originally postulated in the Niirnberg Charter
right down to the present time. It is believed that enough
evidence has been adduced to support the proposition that,
although the notion of crimes against peace is most vital in future
punishment of aggression, unfortunately, however, the tribunals
that have dealt with these crimes have left them rather vague and
uncertain, thus casting serious doubts upon the question of
whether there are such crimes in international law. 99 International legislation on the same subject has similarly met insuperable
difficulties, largely because the generalities of the Niirnberg
Charter and Judgment have permeated its prescriptions. But if
this be the situation for international law, the internal legislation
of the States is more successful in this regard, for it has clearly
made aggression a prohibited activity of the government. It
would seem, therefore, that the domestic legislation of some States
is far ahead of the requirements of general international law. It
may be that crimes against peace should be punished by the
domestic criminal law of the State, since presently there is no
international criminal court to assume jurisdiction over offenders.
This, however, does not detract from the desirability of clearly
recognizing the criminality of aggressive war on the international
plane. It is thus hoped that future international legislation in
97 The reference to acts of aggression in Article 1, para. 1 and the limitation
upon the use of force in Article 2, para. 4 of the United Nations Charter would
seem to be of little help here. For discussion of these provisions, see Goodrich
& Hambro, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents 59, 67
(1946).
98 MeDougal and Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The

Legal Regulation of International Coercion 59-62 (1961).
99 See Woetzel, op. cit. supra note 20, at 170.
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this area will firmly implant the conception of crimes against
peace with as much clarity and precision as it can reasonably
muster. Under such a development, the charges levelled against
the prosecution and punishment of aggressors after the termination of a war will accordingly be eliminated.

